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Abstract. This paper examines the relationship between the discovery of illegal behaviour by 
companies on the stock price. It examines whether shareholders care about illegal corporate 
behaviour and punish companies by driving the stock price down. The empirical results show 
that stock prices react negatively on the announcement date of corporate malfeasance. We 
examine different impacts of the type of illegal behaviour, the level of misconduct, the phase and 
the magnitude. 
 





Responsible corporate behaviour received a lot of attention during the last 
decade in the CSR literature. After the U.S. financial markets being troubled in 2002 by 
several major scandals, involving companies like Enron and Tyco, financial ethics 
received a lot of attention by a much broader public. This paper examines the 
relationship between the discovery of illegal behaviour of listed companies and their 
stock price. It examines whether shareholders care about corporate misconduct and 
punish companies by driving down the stock price. And if so, how heavy does the 
market penalise this behaviour?  
 
 
2. Research design 
2.1. Hypotheses 
 
This study examines the effect of the announcement of illegal corporate 
behaviour on stock prices. The examined types of illegal behaviour are insider trading, 
corruption, tax fraud, accounting fraud and a residual group (e.g. theft or employee 
enrichment). Three other dimension are examined as well. First, it is examined whether 
there is a differences if the illegal behaviour has a direct impact on the firm’s profits or 
bottom-line (intrinsic value) or on shareholders trust (indirect impact). Second, the 
impact of the scope of the illegal behaviour is examined. Is there a difference between 
malfeasance at company-level or at the corporate agent level (employee or manager)? 
Third, the study looks into differences of the phase of the corporate misconduct. Is there 
a difference between just a rumour and a more formal investigation, such as a police 
investigation or a litigation phase? 
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  We define the following four hypotheses: 
Hyp.1 – Stock prices of listed firm show a negative abnormal return upon the 
announcement of the corporate misconduct 
This hypothesis is tested for all categories of malfeasance. Is there a significant 
difference between the effects of different categories on the stock prices? Do 
shareholders penalise certain types of malfeasance harder than other types? Or, maybe 
not at all? 
 
Hyp.2 – A value-impact corporate misconduct exhibits a larger negative abnormal 
return of stock returns than a malfeasance with only an impact on the trust of 
shareholders 
This hypothesis examines difference in the impact of corporate malconduct which has a 
direct impact on the value of the firm such as accounting fraud and illegal behaviour 
which has no direct impact on firm’s profit (e.g. insider trading by the CEO). We expect 
a larger negative abnormal return of stock returns for value-impact corporate 
malconduct. 
 
Hyp.3 – Corporate misconduct at the firm level has a larger negative abnormal return 
than at the individual level 
Corporate misconduct can occur both at the individual level as well as at the firm level. 
We can expect the cost of malfeasance at the corporate level to be accounted to the firm 
and thereby to the shareholder level. Legal fees, penalties, loss of customers, increased 
regulation and so on have a direct impact on the firm’s profits and therefore on 
shareholders’ returns. The cost of misconduct at the individual level are borne by the 
involved employees only. We therefore expect a larger negative abnormal return of 
stock prices of illegal corporate activities at firm level. 
 
Hyp.4 – The further corporate malfeasance is along the formal investigation procedure, 
the larger the abnormal negative return 
This hypothesis examines three different phases: rumour, police investigation and court 
phase. We expect the impact of rumour to have a smaller information content to 
investors since the true nature of the malfeasance is still highly uncertain. The further 
down the formal investigation and court phase the information of the announced illegal 
behaviour is, the higher the price impact.  
 
2.2. Sample description 
 
The paper examines the impact of the public announcement of 57 illegal 
corporate activities in the period 1994 till 2003 in financial press (Het Financieele 
Dagblad,  De Financieel Economische Tijd) on stock prices of Belgian and Dutch 
companies listed on Euronext Brussels and Euronext Amsterdam. The paper examines 
if the announcement exhibits any abnormal return behaviour on the announcement date 
by means of an event study. Furthermore, it is examined whether the market’s response Do financial markets discipline firms for illegal corporate behaviour? 
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lags by examining the cumulative abnormal returns over a period of twenty trading days 
after the announcement (post-announcement drift).  
 
2.3. Event study methodology 
 
To evaluate the impact of the public announcement of corporate malconduct, an 
event-time study is used. An event study examines if the average abnormal return on the 
event day is equal to zero (null hypothesis) versus an alternative hypothesis of a 













AAR H        [1] 
The average abnormal return (AARE) on the event day is the aggregation of the 











1        [2] 
On the event day and on twenty trading days before and after the 
announcement, resulting in a 41-day event window, abnormal returns are being 
calculated to examine returns behaviour around the event date. Individual stock 
abnormal returns (ARi,t) are measured as the difference between the realized or actual 
return on the event day (Ri, t) and the expected return E[Ri, t], which is the benchmark 
normal return in the absence of the event. Several methods exist to estimate the 
expected return of the stocks. This study uses the market adjusted model and the market 
model for an estimation of the benchmark expected return for each individual stock. 
  The expected return of a stock in the market-adjusted model is the current 
market index return. This model thus uses no information from outside the event 
window to calculate abnormal returns during the event period. Market model abnormal 
returns are calculated as  
( ) t m i i t i t i R b a R AR , , , ˆ ˆ ⋅ + − =        [3] 
where ‘^’ denotes the OLS-estimates from the market model:  
t i t m i i t i e R b a R , , , + ⋅ + =        [4] 
with Ri, t = the return of stock i in period t; Rm, t = the market index return in period 
t; ai, bi = intercept and slope coefficient of the market model (stock-i-specific and 
time-independent parameters); ei, t = random disturbance term of the market model for 
stock i in period t. In order to calculate market model abnormal returns information from 
outside the event window is used. The parameters of the market model are estimated over 
a period from –220 to –21 trading days before the event day. The significance of mean 
abnormal returns is first tested using the standard Brown and Warner (1985) test statistic 
assuming cross-sectional independence, which standardizes abnormal returns for each 
stock by its standard deviation calculated from the estimation period. Significance is also 
tested by using a non-parametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test. 
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3. Empirical results 
 
The empirical results show that stock prices react negatively on the 
announcement date of the illegal activity (on average for the full sample a 
market-adjusted abnormal return of –0.94% and an abnormal market model return of 
–0.86%) (see day [0] in Table 1). On day [+1] an additional negative abnormal return of 
-1.03% is found. The immediate announcement effect seems quite small, although we 
observe a declining abnormal return over the first twenty trading days. Interestingly, the 
announcement of insider trading did not reveal a significant abnormal return on the 
announcement date (Table 2). This is striking since the reputational effect of insider 
trading is often cited as an argument against this type of behaviour (Engelen, 2003). Do 
shareholders not care? Or is their reaction very slow? Tables 2 to 4 report the market 
reaction to the announcement of the different types of corporate misconduct. Illegal 
activities with a direct impact on the bottom line show a higher abnormal return impact 
than the category of indirect impact on the firm’s reputation. Illegal behaviour at firm 
level shows greater impact than at the individual level. Announcement of illegal 




The results show a cumulative abnormal return of about 2% for [0,+1]. This 
results hides differences for the sub samples. There was hardly any reaction of investors 
with respect to corruption news. The insider trading and tax fraud news shows a very 
small reaction on day [0] and a larger, delayed reaction on day [+1]. Investors seem to 
anticipate news on accounting fraud as an abnormal return of -10.40% is found on day 
[-2]. Future research will fine-tune the above results by expanding the sample, by 
comparing a larger sample of countries, by looking at long-term effects and changes in 
the risk profile of companies. It will focus on the impact and consequences of the results 
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Abnormal return behaviour for the entire sample 
 
 




Abnormal return behavior for the„“Insider Trading” subsample 




Abnormal return behavior for the „Corruption” sub-sample 
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ONE REASON: THE EUROPEAN UNION 
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Abstract.  Times are moving fast, especially if political changes are coming up. Romania’s 
accession to the European Union is followed by several changes in the Human Resource 
Management; in Romania itself, but also in the other EU countries. Employees are moving 
beyond borders to work abroad and need to be caught and imbedded in the new working 
environment. Motivation is an important issue, but also other appeals for qualified staff to 
decide upon the move into a foreign European country. Further of importance is the integration 
and therefore new demands for the Human Resources Management, of the non native new 
employees. Dangers and mistakes that occur due to wrong integration and cultural 
misunderstandings may harm the good intensions of cross-country and -cultural working.  
 





Romania and Bulgaria joined the European Union by January 1
st of 2007, that 
means 348.994 skm (or 8,7% of the total surface) have been added to the surface of the 
unity of states and an additional 29,7 million citizens (6,5%) whereof 65% - 70% are 
potential new employees in all other EU states (depending on retirement age). 
(Alvarez-Plata, 2003). Persons that may have the intention to leave their home country 
to work within the EU, but also over 300 million people of all other EU states that could 
potentially work in Romania, a reciprocal possible movement. In this context it is very 
important to reflect that the possible moving can include a dislocation or adjustment of 
“the right people” at the “right location”. The EU growing includes also new markets 
and new strategic targets and approaches. Locations, workplaces and fabrics can be 
moved due to the EU growing, specialists, but also normal workers might be needed in 
new places, manpower as well as knowledge has to be present in another place. 
To underline this aspect a bit more, following influencing factors shall be 
mentioned, which play quite an important role in the manpower requirements planning 
after EU enlargement. External influences for manpower requirements: demographic 
development; economics factors; seasonal differences; competitive behavior; changes 
in the market structure; political development; changes in labor- and social laws; 
technological improvement (Nicolai, 2006). 
The EU accession is definitely to be seen as a part of the political development, 
as well as other globalizing intentions, which can lead to other needs of manpower 
requirements but also personnel layoff. Other quite easy to understand factors are the 
seasonal differences and changes in the market structure which can lead to the need of 
shifting personnel to other locations. Internal influences are the following: reformation 
of workflows; deeper production circles; improvement in communication- information- 